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Private Property, Public Use, and Just Compensation:
The Economics of Eminent Domain
1. Introduction
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution says that the government shall not take
private property for public use without paying just compensation. 1 This provision,
referred to as the eminent domain, or takings, clause, has generated an enormous amount
of case law and scholarly literature aimed at determining exactly what sort of government
actions constitute a compensable taking, and what amount of compensation should be
paid when they do. Economists have made a substantial contribution to this debate
regarding both the proper scope of takings and the conditions under which compensation
should be paid.
The takings clause has two key components: (1) the public use requirement, and
(2) the just compensation requirement. These components serve to restrict the conditions
under which the government can take private property. The public use requirement
restricts when the taking of private property is justified. In terms of efficiency,
government intervention in the market is justified for providing public goods and
regulating externalities. In its role as a public good provider, the government often seeks
to use eminent domain to acquire the necessary land, an action that seems acceptable
based on the plain meaning of the eminent domain clause, given that the land is being put
to “public use.” However, economists have argued that the proper justification for
takings is to overcome the holdout problem associated with land assembly, which
suggests that eminent domain should not be used for all public projects, only those
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The actual clause reads: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
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involving assembly. More controversially, it implies that eminent domain should also be
available for private projects requiring assembly, as in the case of urban renewal. The
recent Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. New London2 reflects this logic.
The second component of the takings clause, that users of eminent domain must
pay “just compensation,” specifies the terms under which private property can be taken.
These terms can affect both the distribution of the benefits and costs associated with the
taking, and the incentives parties face. Courts have defined just compensation to be the
fair market value of the taken property. Although it might appear that this requirement
protects the interests of private property owners, many have argued that this measure
under-compensates owners because it does not reflect the amount they would accept in a
consensual sale. It therefore creates the risk of excessive transfer of private property to
public use, as well as raising questions of fairness. The difficulty with using the owner’s
true reservation price as the measure of compensation, however, is that it is unobservable,
which creates the countervailing risk of opportunism by sellers. Thus, the market-value
measure represents a practical compromise.
Eminent domain is typically couched in terms of physical acquisitions of
property, for which compensation is universally required by courts. Much more
pervasive, however, are government regulations that restrict the use of private property
without physically acquiring it. Examples include zoning, environmental and safety
regulations, historic landmark designation, and laws promoting equal opportunity for
disabled or other disadvantaged groups. Historically, courts have granted governments
broad police power to enact such regulations in the public interest without triggering the
need for compensation. Occasionally, however, a regulation goes so far in reducing the
2
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value of a regulated property that the owner seeks to have the regulation declared a
“regulatory taking” for which compensation is due. 3
From an economic perspective, there is no substantive difference between a
government action that involves an outright seizure of property for purposes of providing
a public good, and one that merely regulates that property for purposes of preventing an
external harm (Kaplow, 1986; Hermalin, 1995). In both cases, the government imposes a
cost on the landowner in order to provide a social benefit, where the action is justified on
efficiency grounds only if the gain (whether in the form of a benefit conferred or a harm
prevented) exceeds the cost. From a legal perspective, however, the question of whether
compensation is due is treated quite differently in the two types of cases—it is virtually
always required for physical acquisitions (however slight), but is rarely required for
regulations.
While much of the discussion of just compensation for takings has addressed its
“justness,” most recent economic analyses have focused on a different aspect of the
compensation question—namely, whether the payment of compensation creates a moral
hazard problem that causes landowners to overinvest in land that may be suitable for
public use. (This literature does not distinguish between physical and regulatory takings.)
The key result in this area, due originally to Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984), says
that compensation must be lump sum in order to prevent moral hazard. A corollary of
this conclusion is that zero compensation is efficient.
While the economic logic of this “no compensation result” is unassailable—it
represents a direct application of standard results from the economics of insurance—it
has understandably generated considerable controversy because of the perceived
3
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unfairness of the proposal, as well as its apparent inconsistency with the constitutional
requirement of just compensation (at least in the case of seizure). As a result, several
counterarguments have emerged to justify compensation, including the need to restrain
excessive government takings, the perverse incentives that a no-compensation rule
creates for the timing of development, the insurance benefits that compensation provides
to risk-averse landowners, and the “demoralization costs” that arise when compensation
is not paid. The conclusions from these studies shed considerable light on takings law,
particularly in the area of regulatory takings.
In this essay, we present an overview of the economics of eminent domain. We
begin in Section 2 with a brief review of the relevant case law, both for physical
acquisitions and for regulatory takings. We then survey the academic literature that
examines eminent domain from an economic perspective. Section 3 considers the
economic justification for eminent domain, focusing on the public use requirement and
the land assembly problem. Section 4 examines the just compensation requirement,
focusing primarily on its distributional implications. Section 5 then surveys the literature
on the impact of compensation on the incentives of landowners to invest in property
subject to a taking or regulatory risk, and also of the government to exercise its taking or
regulatory powers. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our conclusions. Throughout the
essay, we draw on a simple modeling framework that can be readily adapted to address
various issues that have been discussed in the literature. This allows us to examine these
issues within a common paradigm.

2. An Overview of the Case Law

4

2.1. Physical Acquisitions
As noted above, physical acquisitions of land universally require compensation. 4 The
question then becomes, what is the proper amount of compensation? The Constitution
requires just compensation, which the courts have interpreted to be the fair market value
of the taken property. What constitutes market value, however, is sometimes open to
interpretation. For example, following the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963,
the government took title to various personal possessions of Lee Harvey Oswald as part
of its evidence collection. The statute authorizing this action required that just
compensation be paid to his widow. The question arose as to what constituted the fair
market value of these items. The district court awarded $3,000, based on the fair market
value of items that were “similar in kind” to the items taken. However, the appeals court
increased the award to over $17,000, which reflected the market value of the actual items
as enhanced by their connection to the infamous crime.5 Similarly, in 1997 the
government took possession of the “Zapruder film,” a home video that captured the
assassination on film, declaring it a public record. Again, the question arose as to the fair
market value of the film. In this case, a three judge panel awarded the family $16 million
in compensation. The point is that it is not clear how one should determine fair market
value in such cases.
While the legal definition of just compensation is, at least in principle, settled law,
the question of what constitutes public use is not. Although the law is clear that it
includes the provision of public goods such as parks, roads, and hospitals, the extent to
which public use also includes a broader set of actions aimed at increasing public well-

4
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See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 423 N.E.2d 320 (1981), reversed 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
See Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1973), and Adelstein (1974).
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being has been open to debate. This question arises most notably in the case law
involving the use of eminent domain to acquire land for use in private projects with some
purported social benefits such as economic redevelopment.
In general, the courts have upheld the right of the government to use eminent
domain for economic redevelopment projects. An early case establishing this principle
was Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 26, 1954), which involved a redevelopment plan by
Washington, D.C., that sought to eliminate blight and redesign neighborhoods. The
Supreme Court found that all property in the designated area, including non-blighted
property, could be taken by eminent domain, since redevelopment of the entire area was
in the public interest. Similarly, in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit
(304 N.W.2d 455, 410 Mich. 616, 1981), the Michigan Supreme Court allowed the city to
condemn an entire ethnic neighborhood in order to clear the way for a new General
Motors assembly plant. The Court argued that, although the intended use of the acquired
land was private, the public use requirement was satisfied by the new jobs and tax
revenue that the plant would provide.
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (467 U.S. 229,1984), the Supreme Court
upheld the Hawaii Land Reform Act, which allowed the use of eminent domain to
transfer land from lessors to lessees. In this case, the statute sought to correct a land
market inefficiency stemming from an extraordinary concentration of landownership that
prevented the “normal functioning of the State’s residential land market.” In its ruling,
the Court noted that “government does not itself have to use property to legitimate a

6

taking; it is the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass muster under the
Public Use Clause.”6
Recently, the Supreme Court revisted the question of what constitutes public use
in Kelo v. New London (125 S.Ct. 2655, 545 U.S. 469, 2005). The case concerned a
development plan adopted by the city of New London in 2000 aimed at revitalizing the
distressed downtown and waterfront areas of the city. The plan included taking the
needed land from unwilling sellers, several of whom filed suit to block the condemnation
of their homes. The Connecticut Supreme Court found for the city, arguing that the
planned development satisfied the public use requirements of both the State and U.S.
Constitutions. In 2005 the U.S. Supreme Court agreed.
Although there is considerable case law establishing the basic principle that
public use includes private uses with public benefits, courts have not universally accepted
this principle. For example, in 2004 – just a year before Kelo – the Michigan Supreme
Court reversed its holding in Poletown. In Wayne v. Haycock (684 N.W.2d 765, 471
Mich. 445, 2004) the Court emphatically rejected its earlier argument that a private
taking can satisfy the public use requirement merely by demonstrating a general
economic benefit of the project to the community. It argued that its ruling in Poletown
was contrary to the fundamental protection of property rights afforded by the
Constitution. These two conflicting opinions from the same court reveal the lack of
consensus among judges regarding the exact meaning of public use.
2.2 Regulatory Takings
The case law on regulatory takings has established several principles for determining
when a government regulation constitutes a taking for which compensation is due These
6
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include: (1) the noxious use doctrine, (2) the diminution of value test, (3) the existence of
investment-backed expectations, (4) the existence of a reciprocity of advantage, and (5)
the nuisance exception. This section provides a brief overview of the key cases that
established these principles.
The noxious use doctrine was established in 1887 in Mugler v. Kansas (123 U.S.
623, 1887). The case involved a challenge to a Kansas state law prohibiting the operation
of breweries because they were public nuisances. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled
that the government could act under its police power to prevent activities that are
“injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community,” so-called “noxious uses,”
without the need to pay compensation for any associated reduction in land value.
In 1922 the Court altered this position in the famous case of Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon (260 U.S. 393, 1922) when it established the “diminution of value” test.
The case challenged a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited coal companies from any
mining that threatened the safety of surface owners due to cave-ins. The Court ruled that
a regulation that “goes too far” in reducing the value of a landowner’s property
constitutes a taking and hence requires compensation, even when the regulation seeks to
prevent public harm. This case marked a watershed in takings law because, previously,
takings were usually limited to physical acquisitions of property by the government; until
then, most efforts to obtain compensation for “mere regulations” had failed, due in large
part to the noxious use doctrine.
However, the Court in Pennsylvania Coal did not articulate a test for determining
when a regulation had gone too far, leaving it instead to be determined on a case-by-case
basis. The Court did not argue for a general rule of compensation because it recognized
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that the government “could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the law” (Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon 1922, p. 413). At the same time, however, it acknowledged that a rule of
no compensation for regulations would, given “the natural tendency of human nature,”
result in overregulation until “at last private property disappear[ed].” Thus, the
diminution of value standard was meant to balance the costs of compensation (a stifled
government) against the benefits of compensation (protection of private property and a
limitation of government excess).
In 1978 the Court added a third factor to the consideration of whether a
government regulation constitutes a taking, namely, whether it interferes with “distinct,
investment-backed expectations” of the landowner. This factor is similar to the
diminution of value test in that it considers the effect of the regulation on the landowner
(as opposed to the nuisance exception, which focuses on the purpose of the regulation).
The case, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York (366 N.E.2d 1271, N.Y.
1977; affirmed 438 U.S. 104, 1978), involved the question of whether the City of New
York could prevent the owners of Grand Central Terminal from erecting an office tower
over the terminal by declaring it an historical landmark. The Court held that it could,
without being obliged to pay compensation.
A dissenting opinion in the Penn Central case suggested a fourth factor for
consideration, which the Court subsequently adopted in the 1980 case of Agins v.
Tiburon (157 Cal.Rptr. 373, 1979; affirmed 447 U.S. 255, 1980). In this case, the Court
held that a landowner subject to a zoning ordinance “will share with other owners the
benefits and burdens of the city’s exercise of its police power. In assessing the fairness
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of zoning ordinances, these benefits must be considered along with any diminution in
market value that the appellants might suffer” (Agins v. Tiburon, 1980, p. 262). In
adopting this view, the Court embraced the argument from the Penn Central dissent that
“a taking does not take place if the prohibition applies across a broad cross section of
land and thereby ‘secure[s] an average reciprocity of advantage’.”
Finally, in 1992, the Court added another consideration for determining whether a
regulation would constitute a taking. The so-called “nuisance exception” stated that
government regulations that prohibit activities that would not be allowed under a state’s
common law of nuisance would not require compensation, regardless of their impact on
the landowner. The case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (112 S.Ct. 2886, 505
U.S. 1003, 1992), concerned a developer who had purchased two identical beachfront lots
with the intent of developing them for residential use. Although development was
permitted at the time the lots were purchased, the State subsequently passed a law that
prohibited development, prompting the developer to seek compensation under the takings
clause. The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled in favor of the State, based on the broad
regulatory powers that have been granted to state and local governments, but the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the decision and found that compensation was due. The reversal
invoked the diminution of value principle, arguing that the law deprived the landowner of
“all economically beneficial use.” However, the Court included a provision that, if the
state could show that the prohibited activity would also be prohibited under the common
law of nuisance, it could avoid paying compensation. This gave rise to the “nuisance
exception,” which mirrors the noxious use doctrine.

10

This brief overview of case law has identified a number of factors that the courts
have considered in implementing the takings clause of the Constitution. We turn next to
the question of what economics can contribute to our understanding of these and related
factors.

3. The Public Use Requirement and Land Assembly
On its face, the public use requirement would seem to limit the use of eminent domain to
government provision of public goods like highways or parks. This interpretation has
appeal both in terms of the plain meaning of the phrase, and the well-accepted role of the
government in providing public goods. On closer examination, however, it turns out to
be inconsistent, both with economic theory, and, as evidenced by the case law, with the
way courts have decided public use cases. The goal of this section is therefore to develop
the proper economic interpretation of public use. The discussion, which is based on the
classic examination of this question by Merrill (1986), involves distinguishing between
the free rider problem associated with public goods, and the holdout problem associated
with land assembly (Cohen, 1991).
3.1. Public Goods and the Free Rider Problem
Public goods have the characteristic that once they are provided, their benefits are
available to all consumers, including those who have not contributed to the cost of
provision.7 Because of this non-excludability, or free-rider, problem, providers expect to
have difficulty in exacting payment from consumers, which leads to underprovision of
such goods by the private market. Efficiency therefore dictates that the government
should either subsidize public goods, or take over their provision altogether, and then use
7
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its tax powers to coerce payment from consumers. In this sense, government provision
and financing of public goods requires a kind of “forced purchase” by consumers.
Although the free-rider problem provides a justification for government provision
of public goods, it does not by itself justify the acquisition of land by eminent domain.
For this, we turn to a second economic problem, namely, land assembly and the holdout
problem.
3.2. Land Assembly and the Holdout Problem
Some large-scale projects require the assembly of several contiguous parcels of land
whose ownership is dispersed. Examples include public projects like highways and
parks, but also private projects like railroads and commercial developments. The
problem facing providers in these cases is that, once the assembly becomes public
knowledge, each landowner realizes that he or she can impose substantial costs on the
developer by refusing to sell. Imagine, for example, that a road builder has decided on
the optimal path for a highway and has assembled several parcels along the route. The
refusal of any one owner to sell would greatly increase the cost of completing the project,
if not preventing it from being completed altogether (the proverbial “highway to
nowhere”). This knowledge confers significant monopoly power on landowners, who
can hold out for prices significantly in excess of their true valuations. 8
To further illustrate the nature and implications of the holdout problem, consider
the following simple model.9 Suppose a developer wishes to acquire two adjacent parcels
8

For a general discussion of the holdout problem, see Cohen (1991) and Posner (2003, p. 55). For a more
formal analysis, see Strange (1995). Shavell (2007) shows that eminent domain may be justified even
when owners do not behave strategically to exploit their monopoly power. The mere fact that owners vary
in their reservation prices, which the assembler cannot observe, may preclude market acquisition when the
number of owners is large and all parcels are necessary for the project to proceed.
9
The model is based on Dixit and Olson (2000), Menezes and Pitchford (2001), and Miceli and Segerson
(2007).
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of land to complete a project worth V dollars. Each parcel is worth v dollars individually
to its owner (and to the developer), but
V>2v,

(1)

reflecting the value of assembly. Suppose that bargaining between the developer and the
landowners can take place at two distinct time periods: “now” and “later.” The developer
can proceed if he acquires both parcels now, one now and one later, or both later, but he
incurs a cost of delay equal to dollars for each parcel acquired later. 10 Assume,
δ

however, that
δ

V–2 >2v,

(2)

so the project is profitable even if acquisition of both parcels is delayed. After period
two, though, the project becomes infeasible.
Proceeding in reverse sequence of time, we first consider the case where both
sellers refused to sell in the first period (i.e., both were holdouts). Since it is in all parties
interests to reach an agreement in the second period (for after that, there is no surplus to
divide), we assume that both owners sell (Cohen, 1991, p. 354). For simplicity, we
assume that the sellers obtain all of the surplus from the project, which they split
evenly.11 Thus, each receives a price of V/2– . By the same logic, if both sell in period
δ

one, they each receive a price of V/2. Clearly, therefore, the sellers are better off if both
sell in period one because this saves on the cost of delay.

10

This specification reflects an implicit assumption that early acquisition of one parcel provides some
benefits to the developer. In other cases, it may not be feasible to commence the project until all parcels
are acquired. When this is true, it would not be appropriate to treat the costs of delay as proportional to the
number of holdouts (as we do here). Miceli and Segerson (2007) show that under this alternative scenario,
a joint holdout is still a possible equilibrium (though it is not the only one).
11
Miceli and Segerson (2007) consider the more general case where the parties split the surplus according
to the Nash bargaining solution. None of the results depends on how the surplus is divided.
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Now consider the case where one seller sells in period one, say for P1, while the
other holds out. If the developer then acquires the second parcel in period two for P2, his
δ

return is V– –P1–P2, but if he fails, his return is v–P1. Equating these returns and solving
for P2 yields the maximum he will pay for the second parcel:
δ

P2 = V – – v.

(3)

Finally, consider the determination of P1. Substituting (3) into the developer’s return for
the overall project, setting the result equal to zero, and solving for P1 yields
P1 = v.

(4)

Comparison of (3) and (4) reveals that P2>P1 by (2). Thus, being the lone holdout in
period two is better than being the lone seller in period one. Condition (2) also implies
δ

that V – – v>V/2 (that is, it is better to be the lone seller in period two than to sell jointly
δ

δ

in period one), while (1) implies V – – v> V/2– (that is, it is better to be the lone seller
in period two than to sell jointly in period two).
Given these relationships, we can now determine the equilibrium strategies of the
sellers. The payoff matrix for this game is shown in Table 1, 12 from which it is easy to
verify that the game has the structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Thus, the dominant
strategy for both players is to sell “later” (that is, hold out), while the joint optimum is for
both to sell “now.”13
[Table 1 here]
It is worth noting that delay would not occur in this model if the developer were
seeking to acquire a single parcel because the seller would gain no advantage by waiting

12

Note that although the model involves two periods, we can treat it as a one-shot game given that we have
assumed that any sellers who held out in period one (i.e., played “later”) will sell in period two.
13
The same result arises if the sellers enter sequentially. In that case, the unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium is a joint holdout.
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to sell. Thus, the holdout problem is a result of strategic behavior by sellers during the
“entry game” rather than a breakdown in bargaining per se. This illustrates the often
misunderstood point that a true holdout problem can only occur in cases of land assembly
(Miceli and Segerson, 2007).14
One solution to the problem of holdouts is to allow “forced sales;” that is, to take
away an owner’s right to refuse to sell at the offered price. The power of eminent domain
represents such a forced sale at a price set by the court. 15 The logical implication of our
discussion of the holdout problem, therefore, is that the power of eminent domain should
be granted to any developer, public or private, engaged in assembly, a conclusion that
seems contrary to the plain meaning of public use. We address this dilemma in the next
section.
3.3. The Means-Ends Distinction and Public Use
In his analysis of public use, Merrill (1986) refers to the argument that the government
alone should have the takings power, and only then when it is providing a public good, as
the “ends approach” to public use because it concerns the use to which the land will be
put. In contrast, the “means approach” deals with the manner in which the land is
acquired—specifically, whether or not assembly is involved. Our discussion of public
goods and land assembly has shown that these are separable problems: not all public
goods require assembly, and not all projects requiring assembly are public goods. This
observation suggests the following taxonomy of cases:
14

The exact nature of the social cost of the holdout problem is unclear in the literature. Some have
described it as a problem of monopoly (Posner, 2003, p. 55; Knetsch and Borcherding, 1979, p. 244), while
others have characterized it in terms of transaction costs or breakdowns in bargaining (Shavell, 2004, p.
125). The monopoly argument seems to suggest that projects involving holdouts will be underprovided
(due to the overpricing of land), while the bargaining cost approach tends to focus on delay as the primary
source of inefficiency (Fischel, 1995a, p. 68). The simple model here is obviously of the latter type.
15
Eminent domain is therefore an example of a “liability rule” (Calabresi and Melamed, 1972).
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I. private good, no assembly
II. public good, assembly
III. public good, no assembly
IV. private good, assembly
Consider first case I, which involves a private good with no assembly. An
example is a transaction involving the sale of a single parcel from one party to another.
In this case, neither the ends approach nor the means approach justifies the use of
eminent domain, a conclusion that is consistent with economic efficiency since there is
no market failure. Thus, the transaction should go through the private market, even if one
of the parties to the transaction is the government. 16
Case II represents the opposite extreme in the sense that there is both a public
good and an assembly problem. The prototypical example is a public highway. Here,
both the means and ends approaches indicate that the use of eminent domain is justified.
Ulen (1992), in his dual constraint model, urges that eminent domain should only be
available in this case. The subsequent discussion will suggest, however, that this may be
overly limiting.
Consider next case III, which involves a public good without assembly. An
example might be when a local government needs to acquire a single parcel of land to
build a police station. In this case, the means and ends approaches yield opposing
conclusions: while the ends approach would allow the use of eminent domain (because
police protection is a public good), the means approach would not (because there is no
assembly involved). Based on our above discussion, it should be apparent that, while it is

16

Calabresi and Melamed (1972) would therefore say that the owners have “property rule” protection of
their land in the sense that they can refuse any offer deemed unacceptable.
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appropriate to use taxation to raise the necessary funds to acquire the land (what we
referred to as a forced purchase), the government should not be allowed to force the sale.
Rather, it should have to acquire the land in a consensual transaction. To allow the
government to use eminent domain to acquire the necessary land in this case would be no
more justified than allowing it to conscript police officers. 17
Even if courts invoke the ends approach and allow the use of eminent domain in
these types of cases, Merrill (1986) suggests that the use of this power will be “selflimiting” owing to the high costs of by-passing the market. As Fischel (1995a, p. 74)
observes, “In markets lacking the holdout problem, in which eminent domain would be
inappropriate, the transaction costs of using the market are typically less than that of
using eminent domain. Thus, the budget preserving instincts of government agencies
may usually be depended upon to limit eminent domain where there are no holdouts.”
The risk of excessive use of eminent domain in case III therefore seems low, though this
is ultimately an empirical question.
Finally, consider case IV, which involves a private good requiring land assembly.
Examples include large real estate developments and urban renewal. Here, the means
approach justifies the use of eminent domain, while the ends approach does not. This
represents the case where economic logic comes into conflict with the plain meaning of
public use. Our survey of the case law, however, showed that courts have tended to act in
accordance with the means approach by awarding the power of eminent domain to
private parties who face significant holdout problems. In doing so, though, they often
take pains to justify their decisions using the ends approach (the existence of public

17

See Fischel (1996), who compares the military draft to takings.
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benefits), even though the proper economic basis is the means approach (the need for
land assembly).
The Kelo case is a good example of this strategy since the Court, in arriving at its
decision, emphasized the significant spillover benefits in the form of jobs and tax
revenues, despite the largely private nature of the development. Merrill (1986, p. 67)
notes that this strategy is not unusual; courts often seek to justify their extension of the
takings power to private parties using the ends approach, given that this seems more
consistent with the plain meaning of the public use requirement.
From a broader perspective, the willingness of courts to allow “private takings” is
not an anomaly (and is not controversial) in other areas of the law. For example, in
contract law, the most common remedy for breach of contract is money damages, which
essentially allows a contractor to renege on his or her promised performance without first
obtaining the other party’s consent, provided that the breaching party is willing to pay
damages set by the court.18 Similarly, nuisance law often allows polluters to continue to
inflict harm on others provided that they are willing to pay the damages suffered by
victims.19 As Cooter (1985) has shown, these cases are indistinguishable in economic
terms from coercive takings under eminent domain.
Finally, Kelly (2006) offers an opposing perspective on the interpretation of
public use. He argues that two factors justify limiting the use of eminent domain to
government (public) projects (i.e., case II). First, private developers generally have the
ability to use secret buying agents as a way of avoiding the holdout problem, whereas the
18

The amount of the damages is usually set equal to the value of performance to the victim of the breach—
so-called expectation damages (Cooter, 1985).
19
The classic case of this sort is Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.s.2d 312, 257
N.E.2d 870 (1970), which many have characterized as a private taking (Fischel, 1995a, pp. 75-77;
Goldberg, 1985).
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government, because of its need for openness, does not. (Fischel (1995, p. 70) makes a
similar point.) Second, the concentrated benefits from private use of eminent domain
create the threat of rent seeking and corruption in the political process as developers seek
to acquire the power of condemnation. In contrast, such a threat is less severe for truly
public projects because the benefits are widely dispersed. Based on these arguments,
Kelly sees a legitimate basis for distinguishing between public and private projects when
determining the proper scope of eminent domain.

4. Just compensation
The second requirement for the use of eminent domain is that the government must pay
“just compensation” to owners whose land is taken. As noted, courts have interpreted
this to mean fair market value, but there is good reason to believe that this measure is
systematically less than the amount owners would ask for their land in a consensual
transaction. The difference reflects the owners’ “subjective value.” 20
The idea can be easily illustrated in a simple supply-demand diagram as shown in
Figure 1. The equilibrium price in this market, P*, can be interpreted as the market value
for a certain class of property because it represents the price at which those parcels
between 0 and Q* have sold in consensual transactions. In contrast, parcels to the right
of Q* did not sell because the reservation prices of the owners exceeded the equilibrium
price. Now suppose one of the owners who did not sell is forced to sell at P*. Such a sale

20

As Posner (2003, p. 56) notes, “the exercise of eminent domain power is really a tax; it taxes away
subjective values.” Epstein (1985) draws the opposite conclusion: namely, that taxes are a form of taking
(as discussed in Section 5.3 below). But see Munch (1976), who conducted an empirical study of the use of
eminent domain for an urban renewal project in Chicago and found that owners of high-valued properties
were actually overcompensated, while owners of low-valued properties were under-compensated.
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imposes a loss on that owner equal to the vertical difference between the relevant point
on the supply curve (that owner’s reservation price) and P*. This difference represents
the owner’s subjective value. In this sense, fair market value must necessarily
undercompensate unwilling sellers.
[Figure 1 here]
Beyond the theory, there is substantial experimental evidence for the divergence
between a property’s market value and the owner’s reservation price for that property,
what Fischel calls the “offer-ask disparity”21 An obvious response is simply to substitute
the owner’s reservation (or asking) price for market value as the measure of
compensation. The problem, of course, is that this value is unobservable and hence
creates the risk of opportunism by owners (in particular, the holdout problem). Indeed,
Knetsch and Borcherding (1979) note that many jurisdictions in Canada formerly used
“value to the owner” as the basis for compensation but abandoned it in favor of market
value for exactly this reason.
Richard Epstein has argued that the loss that market-value compensation imposes
on those owners whose land is taken is only justified if the surplus from the resulting
transfer of resources is widely distributed. This argument, which is based on fairness
rather than efficiency, reflects Epstein’s view that “the compensation requirement of the
eminent domain clause is as much concerned with the distribution of gains and losses
between persons as with their aggregate amount” (Epstein, 1985, p. 115). In the case
where the land being taken is used to provide a public good, this distributional
requirement is generally satisfied because the benefits are, by definition, widely realized.
It is less likely that this will be true, however, for “private takings” because the benefits
21

See (Fischel, 1995a, pp. 207-208; 1995b) and Knetsch and Borcherding (1979).
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are generally concentrated into the hands of a few private interests (the spillover benefits
notwithstanding). In this case, Epstein argues that “the public use requirement is satisfied
only when efforts are made to replicate in the transfer the same distribution of costs and
benefits that is found with normal public goods” (Epstein, 1985, p. 174).
To illustrate his point, Epstein (1985, p. 174) offers the example of the New
Hampshire Mill Act, which allowed would-be mill builders to flood upstream property
without first obtaining the owners’ consent, provided that the mill builders paid owners
150 percent of their market value. The Act thus permitted the private use of eminent
domain based on the logic of the means approach (given the likely existence of a holdout
problem), but required mill builders to pay above-market compensation in an apparent
effort, albeit imperfect, to protect the subjective value of landowners (and possibly to
award them some of the surplus from the transaction). This example illustrates Epstein’s
view that the definition of just compensation cannot be separated from that of public use
in establishing the proper scope of eminent domain.
The extent to which benefits are widely or narrowly distributed might also explain
why courts have typically treated physical acquisitions and regulatory takings differently,
granting compensation in the former case (as required by the Constitution) but not
generally in the latter. In this vein, Epstein (1985, Ch. 14) notes that just compensation
need not always be monetary; in some cases it may be in-kind. For example, zoning
regulations that impose a cost on a particular landowner by depriving him of certain
harmful uses of his land simultaneously prevent others from imposing the same harm on
him. In this way, the regulation provides reciprocal benefits that serve as implicit
compensation to landowners for the loss of certain rights. If the regulation is efficient,
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society is made better off, and no one landowner is asked to bear disproportionate costs. 22
(Note that this reflects the principle of an “average reciprocity of advantage” established
in Agins v. Tiburon.)
In the case of physical takings, in contrast, it is more likely that owners whose
land is taken will bear costs for which in-kind compensation is not present or is
insufficient. The requirement of just compensation therefore necessitates the payment of
monetary compensation to these owners. However, Epstein argues that the need to
impose taxes on other landowners in order to finance the compensation is itself a form of
taking for which just compensation is also due, though in most cases this is satisfied by
the in-kind compensation that taxpayers receive from the public project being produced
by the land from the original taking. (This “transaction” represents the “forced purchase”
described above.)
Based on this argument, Fischel (1995a, 211) has conjectured that landowners
whose land is subject to a takings risk, but who are also taxpayers and consumers of
public goods, may have viewed market-value compensation as the best way to balance
their twin concerns about undercompensation in the event of a taking against the higher
taxes that would be necessary if a more generous compensation rule were put in place.
According to this argument, using fair market value as the definition of just compensation
may be about right. We return to this logic in the discussion of constitutional choice
models of compensation in Section 5.3 below.
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Epstein argues that such regulations serve the same function as the common law of nuisance, which
limits the uses to which owners can put their land without triggering compensation (reflecting the “nuisance
exception” from Lucas). The logic also resembles that underlying condominium contracts and restrictive
land covenants (Cannaday, 1994; Hughes and Turnbull 1996).
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Despite its practicality, market value has the important drawback that, because it
undervalues private property, it potentially leads to excessive transfers of private property
to public use. (Note that this is the flip side of the holdout problem, which, because it
potentially leads to overpricing by owners, results in too little acquisition.) We return to
this issue in Section 5.2.2 below. As noted, however, the transaction costs of using
eminent domain may more than make up for this undervaluation, thus mitigating the
problem of over-acquisition.

5. Land Use Incentives and the Compensation Question
To this point, we have focused on economic theories of the scope of eminent domain.
The primary contribution of more recent economic scholarship, however, has been to
examine the incentives of the compensation rule on the land use decisions of property
owners. The seminal article in this area is by Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984)
(subsequently BRS), who first derived the so-called “no compensation result.”
Specifically, BRS showed that paying full, market value compensation is inefficient
because it creates a moral hazard problem that causes landowners to overinvest in land
that may be suitable for government regulation or seizure. Because of the controversial
nature of this conclusion, however, several counterarguments have emerged to justify
compensation.
This part of the essay begins by deriving the BRS result in a simplified setting,
and then reviews the various responses to it. For reasons noted above, the analysis does
not distinguish between physical takings and regulations (partial takings).
5.1. The Basic Model
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The BRS no-compensation result can be derived using the following simple model. Let
V(x) = the market value of a parcel of land after x dollars have been invested,
V′>0, V″<0;
p = the probability that the land will be taken for public use;
B = the value of land in public use if taken;
C(x) = the amount of compensation paid to the landowner in the event of a taking.
For now, we assume that both p and B are fixed (that is, the taking decision and the
resulting public benefit are exogenous), and we place no a priori restrictions on C(x). In
this setting, the only economic decision by landowners is the choice of how much to
invest in their land. We assume that this investment is irreversible, and that it must be
made before the taking decision occurs, for otherwise, the owner could simply wait until
the taking decision is made and only invest if the land is not taken. This assumption is
not restrictive in the sense that private land is always at risk of being taken or regulated.
Consider first the social optimum. This is the level of investment that maximizes
the expected social value of the land:
(1−p)V(x) + pB − x.

(5)

The resulting first-order condition is
(1−p)V′(x) − 1 = 0,

(6)

which says that the expected marginal value of investment should be set equal to the
marginal cost, where 1−p is the probability that no taking will occur. Note that the level
of investment implied by (6), denoted x*, is less than the amount that maximizes V(x)−x,
which is what the landowner would invest if the probability of a taking were zero.
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Now consider the choice of x actually made by landowner facing the possibility of
a taking. This maximizes the expected private value of the land:
(1−p)V(x)+ pC(x) − x,

(7)

which, unlike (5), depends on the compensation rule. The resulting first-order condition
is
(1−p)V′(x) + pC′(x) − 1 = 0.

(8)

Comparison of (6) and (8) immediately shows that C′=0 is necessary for efficiency. That
is, compensation must be lump sum, a special case of which is zero compensation, or
C(x)≡0. The explanation for this result is that compensation creates a moral hazard
problem. That is, if landowners expect to be fully compensated for their losses in the
event of a taking (i.e., if C=V(x)), they will ignore the possibility that the land might be
taken, thereby rendering their investment socially worthless. As a result of ignoring this
possibility, they will overinvest.
Although this conclusion is based on well-known results from the economics of
insurance, it has received considerable attention, both because of its lack of appeal on
fairness grounds, and the fact that it contradicts the constitutional requirement of just
compensation. The following sections therefore extend the basic model to take account
of various arguments in favor of compensation.
5.2. Endogenous Probability of a Taking
An oft-stated justification for compensation is that it is necessary to prevent the
government from acquiring too much land for public use (Johnson, 1977). To introduce
this consideration into the above model, we need to be explicit about the behavior of the
government. Several behavioral assumptions have been made.
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5.2.1. Benevolent Government
Assume initially that the government makes its taking decisions to maximize social
welfare. Such a government is said to be benevolent (Hermalin, 1995) or “Pigovian”
(Fischel and Shapiro, 1989). To incorporate this factor into the above model, we need to
endogenize the probability of a taking. To that end, we now let the value of the land in
public use, B, be a random variable whose value is realized after the landowner has
invested in his land but before the government makes its taking decision. Let F(B) be the
distribution function of B, which is known by both the landowner and the government.
When the government is benevolent, it will take the land if and only if the realized value
of the public project exceeds the value of the land in private use; that is, if and only if
B≥V(x). This criterion maximizes the ex post value of the land, given x. At the time the
landowner must invest, however, he or she can only compute the probability of a taking,
which is given by 1−F(V(x)).
Since the government acts efficiently by assumption, we continue to focus solely
on the landowner’s choice of x. The expected social value of the land in this case is
given by
∞

F(V(x))V(x) +

∫ BdF ( B) − x .

(9)

V ( x)

The resulting first-order condition for x is
F(V(x))V′(x) − 1 = 0,

(10)

which is identical to (6) with F(V(x))=1−p. In contrast, the expected private value of the
land, corresponding to (7), is
F(V(x))V(x)+ [1−F(V(x))]C(x) − x,

(11)
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which yields the first-order condition
F(V(x))V′(x) + [1−F(V(x))]C′(x) + F′(V(x))V′(x)[V(x)−C(x)] − 1 = 0.

(12)

Comparing this condition to (10) shows that C′=0 is no longer a sufficient condition for
efficiency. Now, in addition to being lump sum, compensation must be equal to the full
value of the land at its efficient level of investment; that is, C=V(x*).
It is important to emphasize that this result is not a consequence of the need to
restrain the government, which we have assumed acts efficiently regardless of the
compensation rule. Rather, full compensation is necessary to prevent a second form of
moral hazard on the part of landowners that arises from the endogeneity of the probability
of a taking. Specifically, given the government’s taking criterion, landowners can reduce
the probability of a taking by increasing their level of investment. (That is, 1−F(V(x)) is
decreasing in x.) Thus, they will tend to overinvest if they expect to be
undercompensated. This effect is captured by the third term on the left-hand side of (12),
which is positive if C<V(x). By the same logic, landowners will underinvest if they
expect to be overcompensated—i.e., if C>V(x). Setting C=V(x*) simultaneously
eliminates both this and the BRS forms of moral hazard (Miceli, 1991).23
Hermalin (1995) shows that two other compensation rules will also yield the
efficient outcome in this context. Under the first, the government pays owners the full
value of the public project in the event of a taking. That is, C=B. In this case, a
landowner’s expected return coincides with the social return in (9), so he or she chooses
the efficient level of investment. This rule works because landowners internalize the full
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Giammarino and Nosal (2005) also derive this result. Cooter (1985) reaches a similar conclusion in the
context of optimal damage remedies for breach of contract.
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social value of their land. The drawback, however, is that it awards landowners the entire
surplus from the public project, which may strike some as distributionally unfair. 24
A second rule that addresses this concern is the “buy-back” rule, which works as
follows: whenever the government initiates a taking, the landowner can retain his or her
property by paying the government the value of the public project. In effect, the
landowner has the option to buy back the seized property for a price equal to B. A
rational landowner will therefore exercise this option when B<V(x), and will not exercise
it when B>V(x), resulting in an efficient taking decision. As for the investment choice,
the landowner will choose x to maximize
V ( x)

∫ [V ( x) − B]dF ( B) − x ,

(13)

0

which yields the first-order condition in (10). Thus, the landowner makes the efficient
investment choice as well.
Hermalin (1995, p. 66) characterizes the difference between these two rules as
follows: “In an externality setting—which essentially is what a takings problem is—the
property right can reside with the citizen, so she is compensated for what is taken; or the
property right can reside with the state, so the citizen pays for the privilege of enjoying
her benefit.” This argument reflects the logic of the so-called “harm-benefit rule,” which
says that compensation is due when the government takes or regulates land for the
purpose of providing a social benefit (e.g., a highway or park), but compensation is not
due when the government acts to prevent a harm (e.g., a zoning ordinance) (Fischel 1985,
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One might wonder, based on the preceding argument, why this “overcompensation” does not induce
landowners to underinvest in order to increase the probability of a taking. The reason is that the resulting
gain, given by B−V(x), is zero at the margin.
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pp. 154-155). Sax (1971) and Bromley (1993) have made arguments along similar lines.25
Despite its intuitive appeal, the problem with this argument is the lack of a meaningful
economic distinction between a “harm imposed” and a “benefit foregone.” (That is, any
foregone benefit can be redefined as a harm, and vice versa.) The difference depends on
how property rights are assigned, and Hermalin’s two rules show that the efficient
outcome can be achieved under either assignment, reflecting the Coase Theorem (Coase,
1960).
Fischel (1985, pp. 158-161), however, proposes a way to justify the logic of the
harm-benefit rule by appealing to transaction costs.26 In particular, Fischel defines what
he calls a “normal behavior standard,” which represents a baseline assignment of
property rights as defined by what landowners can “reasonably” expect to be able to do
with their property. 27 Given this standard, compensation is due for any government
actions that compel landowners to exceed normal behavior (e.g., leaving their land
undeveloped to provide the community with open space), but it is not due for actions that
compel them to comply with normal behavior (e.g., not emitting hazardous waste). The
role of transaction costs in this framework is that it sets normal behavior as the “zero
compensation point,” which presumably minimizes the cost of achieving compliance
because most landowners will engage in normal behavior automatically (i.e., without the
need for government action).
25

In an earlier paper, Sax (1964) proposed a different criterion, namely, that the government should have to
pay compensation when it acquires property rights for its own use (as when it provides a public good), but
it should not be required to pay when it acts as a mediator between private parties (as when it uses zoning
to resolve an incompatible land use problem).
26
Fischel’s proposal reflects an application of arguments first made by Ellickson (1973, 1977) in the
context of zoning.
27
In the economic analysis of law, the legal standard of reasonableness is usually interpreted to mean
efficiency in the sense that it compels individuals to take account, not only of their private costs and
benefits, but also of any external effects that their actions might have. See generally Miceli and Segerson
(1996, p.72) and the discussion of the compensation rule in (14) below.
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Wittman (1984) also proposes a compensation rule based on transaction costs, but
focuses instead on the behavior of the government. Specifically, he argues that
transaction costs are minimized if compensation is only paid when the government acts
inefficiently, because “we would expect the government to act efficiently more often than
not” (p. 74). We consider a formalized version of this rule (though with a different
rationale) below.
5.2.2. Non-Benevolent Government
Many would argue that it is unrealistic to assume that the government automatically
makes the efficient taking decision. More realistic models instead view the government
as acting to further the interests of the majority, which implies that the interests of those
individuals whose land is subject to a taking or regulation will often be ignored, absent a
requirement of compensation.28 A government that only considers the dollar (or
budgetary) cost of a taking (as opposed to its true opportunity cost) is sometimes said to
have “fiscal illusion” (BRS, 1984, p. 88; Johnson, 1977).
We formalize the idea of fiscal illusion by supposing that the government takes a
parcel of land if and only if its value in public use exceeds the required amount of
compensation; that is, if and only if B≥C(x). This criterion suggests that the taking
decision will only be efficient if C(x)=V(x), or if full compensation is paid. The obvious
problem with the requirement, however, is that it sets up a trade-off between moral
hazard and fiscal illusion. One solution is to adopt the lump sum compensation rule
derived above; that is, C=V(x*). Since compensation is lump sum, there is no moral
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Giammarino and Nosal (2005) consider a more general model of government “moral hazard” in which
the government may respond to different constituencies. In this context, they conclude (not surprisingly)
that some amount of compensation, generally linked to the market value of the land being taken, is
necessary to achieve an efficient outcome.
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hazard problem, and because it is full (in equilibrium), the government will only take the
land when it is efficient to do so (Miceli, 1991).
Alternatively, consider the two rules proposed by Hermalin. Since we have
already seen that both induce the efficient level of investment, the only question is
whether they also induce the government to act efficiently. Recall that under the first, the
government pays the landowner the full social value of the project, B. This rule will
leave the government indifferent between taking the land and not taking it, regardless of
the realized value of B. The landowner, however, will only want the taking to occur if
B V(x), which is the efficient condition. Thus, the taking decision will be efficient under
≥

this rule if the government, when indifferent, accedes to the wishes of the landowner. In
this sense, the rule is weakly efficient regarding the government’s taking decision.
Consider next the buy-back rule. Under this rule, recall, the government never
has to pay compensation, so if it has fiscal illusion, it will initiate a taking whenever B>0.
However, the landowner will pay B and retain ownership if V(x)>B. Thus, the land will
pass into public use if and only if that is the efficient outcome.29
As a final option when the government has fiscal illusion, consider the “threshold
rule” proposed by Miceli and Segerson (1994, 1996). Under this rule, the government
pays full compensation if it acts inefficiently to take or regulate the land, but pays zero
compensation if it acts efficiently. Formally, this rule can be written
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Note that both of these rules require the landowner to observe, or the government to reveal, the value of
B. Hermalin shows that when this is not true, there nevertheless exists a compensation rule that achieves
both the efficient level of investment and the efficient taking decision. However, the rule may sometimes
require payment from the landowner to the government. If such payments are not allowed, then the firstbest outcome is not attainable.
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V(x),

if B<V(x*)

0,

if B V(x*).

C=

(14)
≥

The efficiency of this rule can be established as follows.30 First, assuming that
landowners invest in the efficient level of x, the government has an incentive to take or
regulate the land only when it is efficient to do so because it wishes to avoid paying full
compensation, which would result in a net loss of B–V(x*) when the taking is inefficient
(ie., when B<V(x*)). As a result, landowners will anticipate that only efficient takings
(regulations) will occur, and that compensation in these cases will be zero. Thus, they
will choose x*. This logic establishes that the Nash equilibrium is efficient regarding
both the land use and taking decisions. 31
As a positive matter, the appeal of the rule in (14) is that it goes a long way
toward explaining actual legal doctrine, especially in the area of regulatory takings where
compensation is not often required. Most obviously, the rule resembles the diminution of
value test from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922) because it establishes a threshold
for determining when compensation is due. Recall that the Court only vaguely defined
this to be the point at which a regulation “goes too far,” whereas the rule in (14) suggests
a natural threshold based on the efficiency of the regulation. Specifically, compensation
will only be due when the regulation is inefficiently imposed.
In addition, the rule in (14) provides an alternative baseline for defining the zero
compensation point under the harm-benefit rule. Seen in this light, Fischel’s “normal
30

For a more formal proof, see Miceli and Segerson (1994), and Lueck and Miceli (2007). Miceli and
Segerson also prove the efficiency of an alternative version of (14) in which compensation is full if the
landowner invested efficiently and the land is subsequently taken, but zero if he or she overinvested. (The
difference between the two rules is therefore purely distributional.) This rule is of less interest than that in
(14) because it is not very descriptive of actual law, as the discussion in the text will illustrate.
31
In this sense, the efficiency of this rule resembles the efficiency of various negligence rules in bilateral
care models of tort law. See, generally, Shavell (2004, Ch. 8).
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behavior” standard can be interpreted to represent land uses that are efficient. Thus,
regulations that efficiently require landowners to cease engaging in harmful activities
(sub-normal uses) would not trigger compensation according to (14), whereas regulations
that inefficiently interfere with normal behavior would. The noxious use doctrine can
likewise be interpreted in light of (14). Specifically, if we define noxious uses to be those
activities that are efficiently regulated, then the denial of compensation for such activities
is consistent with (14) (and hence is not a contradiction of the diminution of value test).32
Similarly, we can interpret the nuisance exception from Lucas in light of (14).
Recall that under this provision, the government can avoid paying compensation for a
regulation, despite its impact on the landowner, if the regulation prevents an activity that
would constitute a nuisance under the state’s common law. According to the law of torts,
a nuisance is an activity that is unreasonable in the sense that “the amount of the harm
done outweighs the benefits served by the conduct” (Keeton, et al., 1984, p. 630). Thus,
the threshold for zero compensation implied by the “nuisance exception” is exactly that
embodied in (14).
As a final point regarding the rule in (14), consider the case of Keystone
Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictus (480 U.S. 470), which the Supreme Court
decided in 1987. The striking thing about this case is that the facts are remarkably similar
to those in Pennsylvania Coal (the case again involved a state law requiring coal
companies to leave sufficient coal in the ground to prevent cave-ins), yet the Court ruled
that in this case, compensation was not due. This apparent contradiction of the earlier
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Seen in this perspective, Holmes’s ruling in Pennsylvania Coal did not “overturn” the noxious use
doctrine (as claimed in a dissenting opinion by Brandeis), and hence did not represent the fundamental
break in the law that it is often portrayed as. (See, for example, Friedman (1986), who called the case a
watershed in takings law.)
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ruling, however, can be understood as arising from changing economic values, rather
than from a change in the law. As Fischel (1995a, p. 48) notes, “In 1922, anthracite coal
was immensely valuable” while “The value of the surface real estate was not so high.” In
other words, it is reasonable to suppose that the regulation was not efficiently imposed at
that time. In contrast, “By the 1960’s, general growth in personal incomes had driven up
the demand for housing and a pleasant environment. Technological changes over the
same period had reduced concern over extraction of coal, because many substitutes for it
had been developed.” Thus, the regulation was now efficient, so no compensation was
due. Seen in this light, the apparently conflicting decisions in Pennsylvania Coal and
Keystone (like the diminution of value test and noxious use doctrine) are reconcilable by
the rule in (14).
5.3. Constitutional Choice Models
There is another class of takings models, referred to as constitutional choice models, that
envision individuals designing the compensation rule from behind a veil of ignorance
regarding which particular parcels will be taken. In this context, all landowners are at
risk of being takings victims, given that rational individuals realize that it will be efficient
for the government to expropriate some fraction of private land for public use. At the
same time, they recognize that the funds necessary to pay compensation must be raised
through taxation. Thus, in designing the compensation rule, rational landowners will
presumably take into account both sides of the public budget and therefore will not be
overly stingy (for fear that their land will be taken), or overly generous (to avoid
excessive tax liability).33
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See Fischel (1995a, p. 211) and Epstein (1985, p. 196).
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The first model to take this approach was by Fischel and Shapiro (1989), who
extended the basic BRS model as follows. Let
n = the total number of (identical) parcels subject to a taking risk;
s = the number of parcels actually taken for public use;
B(s) = the social value of the land taken, B'>0, B <0;
″

T = the per-person tax liability.
All other variables are defined as above. We assume that the public benefit, B(s), is a
pure public good whose benefits are enjoyed by all landowners, including those whose
land is taken, and we also assume that all landowners pay T. (Thus, takings victims will
receive net compensation of C–T.)34 Finally, we assume that the parcels to be taken are
randomly chosen.35 Thus, we can define the probability that a given parcel will be taken
to be p=s/n. It follows that the probability that a parcel will not be taken is 1–p=(n–s)/n.
Given this model, we can write the realized wealth of owners whose land is not
taken as
wN = V(x) – T + B(s) – x,

(15)

and of owners whose land is taken as
wT = C – T + B(s) – x.

(16)

Thus, a landowner’s expected wealth is
E(w) = (1–p)V(x) + pC – T + B(s) – x.
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(17)

These assumptions are inessential to the conclusions of the model. For example, we could just as easily
assume that only those landowners whose land is not taken receive B and/or pay taxes. (The only effect of
the change would be on the calculation of T.)
35
Note that this is not inconsistent with assembly of contiguous parcels provided that the location of the
public project (or projects) is not known a priori by landowners.

35

The public budget must be balanced, which requires that in equilibrium, nT=sC
(assuming that compensation for takings is the only expense). Given the definition of p,
this may also be written
T = pC.

(18)

Fischel and Shapiro (1989) assume that compensation is specified as a fraction of
the market value of an owner’s land, or C= V(x), 0≤
α

α

≤1, where

α

is chosen by

landowners at the hypothetical constitutional convention. According to this rule,
compensation depends on each landowner’s actual choice of x. In contrast, they assume
that individual taxes are based on the equilibrium level of capital invested; that is,
T=p V(xe) (given (18)). Thus, landowners view taxes as lump sum. Making the
α

appropriate substitutions in (17) and rearranging, we obtain
E(w) = (1–p)V(x) + p [V(x)–V(xe)] + B(s) – x.
α

(19)

Landowners choose x to maximize (19), taking s, , and xe as given. The resulting firstα

order condition is
(1–p+ p)V'(x) – 1 = 0.

(20)

α

Denote the solution to (20) by xe( ). It follows immediately that efficient investment
α

requires =0, or that compensation must be zero, which is simply the BRS result. More
α

generally, (20) implies that xe is increasing in .
α

Whether or not zero compensation is optimal, however, depends on how s, the
number of parcels taken, is determined. If it is either fixed (what Fischel and Shapiro call
an “inexorable” government), or is determined by a benevolent (Pigovian) government,
then moral hazard is the only consideration, and

α

should be set at zero. However, if the

government is majoritarian and cares only about the welfare of owners whose land is not
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taken, then zero compensation will not generally be optimal because some compensation
will be necessary to limit excessive takings.
Note first that the optimal level of s maximizes the aggregate welfare of all
citizens, given by
nB(s) + (n− s)V(x) – nx.

(21)

The first-order condition therefore implies
B'(s) = V(x)/n,

(22)

which is simply the Samuelson condition for a pure public good. In the case of a
majoritarian government, landowners whose land will not be taken are assumed to be in
the majority and hence will choose s to maximize their wealth, as given by (15), subject
to the balanced budget condition in (18) and the compensation rule, C= V(x).36 After
α

making the relevant substitutions and differentiating, we obtain the first-order condition
B'(s) = V(x)/n,

(23)

α

from which it follows that the government’s choice of s is decreasing in

α

(given B <0).
″

That is, the majority will authorize fewer takings as the amount of compensation
increases. Further, comparing (23) and (22) shows that α=1 (full compensation) is
necessary for the taking decision to be efficient. Fischel and Shapiro (1989) show that in
this context, the optimal (second-best) compensation rule involves partial compensation
(i.e., 0< <1) so as to balance the moral hazard problem against the cost of excessive
α

takings.
5.3.1. Alternative Compensation and Tax Rules

36

This approach assumes that, unlike the design of the compensation rule, public spending decisions cannot
be chosen from behind a veil of ignorance.
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This “partial compensation” result hinged on the specific form of the compensation rule
assumed by Fischel and Shapiro. Nosal (2001) adopted their constitutional choice
framework, but re-defined compensation to be equal to the average market value of all
properties in society. That is,
C=

1 n
∑V ( x j ) .
n j =1

(24)

Since landowners are identical, they will all choose the same level of investment, so that
in equilibrium, compensation will equal the full market value of any taken properties.
Taxes continue to be defined by the balanced budget condition in (18).
As in Fischel and Shapiro (1989), landowners in Nosal’s model choose how much
to invest in their land to maximize their expected wealth as given by (17). Landowner i
therefore chooses xi to solve
(1−p)V′(xi) + p(∂C/∂xi) − ∂T/∂xi − 1 = 0,

(25)

taking as given all other landowners’ choices of x. Note that from (24),

∂C/∂xi=V′(xi)/n>0, so the compensation rule distorts the investment choice as in Fischel
and Shapiro (1989). However, in contrast to their model, taxes are not lump-sum. Rather,
(18) implies that ∂T/∂xi= p(∂C/∂xi). Thus, taxes are also distortionary, but the balanced
budget condition ensures that the distortions exactly offset. As a result, (25) reduces to
the efficient condition, and xi=x* for all i.
As for the choice of s, Nosal assumes that a randomly chosen landowner acts as
the “government,” and chooses the amount of land to take without knowing which
particular parcels will be taken. (Thus, his land may be one of the targeted parcels.) He
therefore chooses s to maximize expected wealth in (17), subject to the compensation rule
and balanced budget. Recalling that p=s/n, this yields the first-order condition
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−V/n + C/n − ∂T/∂s + B′(s) = 0.

(26)

Since (18) implies that ∂T/∂s=C/n, this condition reduces to (22), and the efficient level
of s is also chosen.
Nosal’s result is important because it shows that the legal requirement of full,
market value compensation is consistent with efficiency. His compensation rule remains
inconsistent with actual practice, however, because it is not based on the market value of
individual properties. (Thus, if parcels differ, some owners would be overcompensated in
equilibrium and others undercompensated.) In this sense, the specification in Fischel and
Shapiro (1989) is closer to reality. Neither model, however, allows for a divergence
between the market value of land and its subjective value to the owner, as discussed in
Section 4 above.
To address this shortcoming, we define M(x) to be the market value of a parcel as
a function of the investment level, x, where M′>0, and redefine V(x) to be its subjective
value to the owner, where M(x)≤V(x) for all x. Since V(x) is unobservable to the court,
compensation must be based on M. Thus, following Fischel and Shapiro (1989), we
define C=αM(x), where 0≤α≤1.
Taxation is also treated in an unrealistic way by both Fischel and Shapiro and
Nosal. To reflect actual practice, we suppose that taxes are based on the assessed values
of individual parcels, where the assessed value is some fraction of the market value. For
simplicity, we will treat the two as the same. Thus, each landowner faces a tax liability
of T=tM(x), where t is the uniform property tax rate. In this case, (17) becomes
E(w) = (1−p)V(x) + pαM(x) − tM(x) + B(s) − x,
and the first-order condition for x is
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(27)

(1−p)V′(x) + (pα−t)M′(x) − 1 = 0.

(28)

The balanced budget condition in this model, given identical landowners, is
ntM(x)=sC=sαM(x), which implies that t=pα. Thus, the second term in (28) vanishes,
resulting in the efficient level of investment for any value of α.37 In other words, the
compensation rule turns out to be irrelevant with respect to the landowner’s investment
choice. Similar reasoning shows that the first-order condition for s implied by (27)
reduces to (22) for any value of α. Thus, the number of parcels taken is also efficient,
regardless of the compensation rule.
The reason for this surprising conclusion is that the compensation and tax
distortions built into the model exactly offset through the balanced budget condition.38
This logic reflects Epstein’s (1985, p. 196) contention, discussed above, that taxes and
takings are equivalent in the sense that both are non-consensual government seizures of
property that are justifiable only if compensation of some form is paid. In the current
model (as in Nosal’s model), this compensation implicitly occurs through the public
budget, given that landowners are simultaneously taxpayers and potential takings victims.
Thus, any increase in taxes is exactly offset by the higher expected compensation, and
vice versa.39 The idea is similar to the macroeconomic concept of Ricardian equivalence.
5.4. The Timing of Development
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The result continues to hold for non-identical landowners.
In a different context, Hamilton (1975) derived a similar conclusion. Specifically, he showed that in the
Tiebout model of local public good provision, property taxes are not distortionary if communities are
homogeneous in terms of taxable property. The reason is that the public budget transforms the property tax
into a benefit tax. As a result, no free-riding is possible, and so landowners’ housing choices are not
distorted by the property tax. Hamilton argues that zoning will generally be needed to support this outcome.
39
Note that our conclusion that the compensation rule is irrelevant therefore does not support Fischel’s
conjecture that individuals, acting from behind a veil of ignorance, would choose market-value
compensation (see Section 4 above). It does, however, reflect the logic of his argument.
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To this point, we have assumed that the timing of the landowner’s investment decision
does not affect the desirability or feasibility of the government’s taking decision. In
many contexts, this assumption is unwarranted. For example, in the case of physical
takings, the government may favor undeveloped land for public projects so as to save on
the cost of demolishing existing structures. Thus, landowners may be able to lower the
chance that their land will be taken by investing pre-maturely. Similarly, a landowner
may be able to pre-empt a regulatory threat by investing early, for example, by clearcutting a stand of timber before an endangered species is discovered there, or by filling in
a piece of land before it is declared a wetland. Several authors have examined the impact
of the compensation rule on the timing of development.40 The general conclusion of
these studies is that zero compensation is inefficient because it increases the opportunity
cost of waiting to develop, even when that is the efficient option.
To illustrate this effect, we need to add a dynamic element to the above model.
Thus, let VN be the net present value to a landowner of developing now, and let VL be the
net present value of developing later. Assume that VL>VN, so it is privately optimal to
wait. Further, suppose that, if the land is not developed in the initial period, then with
probability p it will yield a social benefit, B, in the next period (for example, provision of
habitat for an endangered species).41 We assume that if this benefit is realized, B>VL, so
that it is also socially optimal not to develop the land in that period. However, if the
benefit is not realized, the land can still be developed. In this setting, it is socially
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See Miceli and Segerson (1996, Ch. 8), Innes (1997), Riddiough (1997), Turnbull (2002), and Lueck and
Michael (2003).
41
We could equivalently assume that development now potentially gives rise to an external cost, E, in the
next period (for example, destruction of the habitat of an endangered species). This reflects the
equivalence, noted above, between a harm imposed and a benefit foregone.
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optimal for the landowner to refrain from developing the land in the initial period if and
only if pB+(1−p)VL>VN, or if and only if
p(B−VL) + (VL−VN) > 0,

(29)

which holds by construction.
Now consider the landowner’s private decision. Suppose that if he does not
develop in period one and the social benefit is realized, the government will take the land
and pay compensation of C. However, if he or she develops in period one, there is no
possibility of a taking. Given these options, the landowner will choose to wait if and only
if pC+(1−p)VL>VN, or if and only if
p(C−VL) + (VL−VN) > 0.

(30)

Comparison of (29) and (30) shows that C=B is necessary to ensure that the landowner
makes the socially optimal decision to wait. In contrast, C=0 may cause the landowner to
develop inefficiently early. Note that this result is similar to the above result that
compensation is necessary to prevent overinvestment when the landowner’s investment
decision affects the probability of a taking.
5.5. Risk Aversion and Compensation
The preceding models have all treated landowners as risk-neutral, but the fact that most
landowners buy insurance against the risk of loss of their property from fire, flood, or
defective title, suggests that they are in fact risk averse. Blume and Rubinfeld (1984)
therefore argue that, since private insurance is not available for takings, the government
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should provide it in the form of compensation.42 It is easy to derive this result in the
context of the above model.
Suppose that landowners have utility over wealth given by U(w), where U′>0 and
U″<0. If wealth in the “no-taking” and “taking” states are given by (15) and (16), and p
is the (fixed) probability of a taking, then the landowner’s expected utility is given by
EU = (1−p)U(wN) + pU(wT).

(31)

Ignoring for now the landowner’s investment choice, we can derive the optimal
compensation rule by maximizing (31) subject to the balanced budget condition in (18).
The resulting first-order condition is
U′(wN) = U′(wT),

(32)

from which it follows that wT=wN. Examination of (15) and (16) shows that C=V, or
compensation should be full. In this context, compensation serves as full insurance that
allocates risk efficiently across possible states.
Of course, the problem with this full-insurance policy is that it once again reintroduces the moral hazard problem. As before, one solution is simply to make
compensation lump-sum; that is, set it equal to the full value of the land at the
landowner’s optimal level of investment. As an alternative, we show in the Appendix
that partial compensation is an optimal (second-best) policy.43
5.6. Michelman’s Approach to Takings
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Kaplow (1986) argues against compensation on the grounds that that private insurance would be superior
to government-provided insurance, but he does not attempt to explain why private insurance for takings is
not available. See the discussion of this point in Fischel and Shapiro (1988, pp. 286-287).
43
This solution reflects the standard trade-off between risk-sharing and moral hazard present in many
principal-agent problems. See, for example, Holmstrom (1979). Note, therefore, that the trade-off is
different from that which yields the partial compensation result in Fischel and Shapiro (1989).
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Perhaps the most influential takings article from outside of the economics literature is by
Michelman (1967). This article is nevertheless of interest to economists because it
proposes a utilitarian standard for takings that depends on three factors: efficiency gains,
demoralization costs, and settlement costs. Efficiency gains represent the dollar value of
the “excess of benefits produced by a [government] measure over losses inflicted by it”
(p. 1214). Michelman argues, however, that existence of this gain alone is not sufficient
for a public project to go forward. In addition, the government must take account of the
demoralization and settlement costs associated with the acquisition of the necessary
property. Demoralization costs are
defined as the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which
accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realization that no
compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost
production … caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their
sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they themselves
may be subject to similar treatment on some other occasion (p. 1214).
In short, demoralization costs are the costs of not paying compensation.
Offsetting this are the settlement costs of paying compensation, which Michelman
defines to be “the dollar value of the time, effort, and resources which would be required
in order to reach compensation settlements adequate to avoid demoralizations costs” (p.
1214). Putting all of these factors together, Michelman concludes that the project should
go forward if and only if the efficiency gains exceed the minimum of the settlement and
demoralization costs, one of which must be paid.44

Symbolically, the project should only go forward if and only if B−C>min(S,D), where B−C represents
the efficiency gains, S is the settlement cost, and D is the demoralization cost. Fischel (1995a, pp. 147-148)

44
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In terms of the formal economic models surveyed above, settlement costs (the
costs of paying compensation) include the transaction costs associated with
condemnation, which generally are not trivial (recall that we argued in Section 3.3 that
they are often large enough to discourage use of eminent domain), as well as the costs
associated with moral hazard.45 The counterpart to demoralization costs is the fear that
people have of being exploited by a majoritarian government, as captured by the above
models of a non-benevolent government (Fischel and Shapiro, 1988, p. 285). In this
sense, the basic trade-off between moral hazard and fiscal illusion emphasized in much of
the economic literature since BRS was anticipated by Michelman.
5.6.1. Does Capitalization Eliminate the Need for Compensation?
A different, and seemingly persuasive, argument against compensation is also attributable
to Michelman. Consider a landowner who purchased a piece of land in the face of a
public debate about a possible regulation that would prevent future development.
Micheman argues that if the regulation is subsequently imposed, the landowner has no
claim for compensation for the lost value because the price he paid for the land should
have been discounted to reflect the threatened regulation. Thus, the landowner “got
exactly what he meant to buy,” and paying him compensation for the loss would be
equivalent to reimbursing the purchaser of a losing lottery ticket (p. 1238).

and Fischel and Shapiro (1988) note that Michelman’s criterion falls between Pareto and Kaldo-Hicks.
Since Pareto requires that all losers must be compensated, the project would only go forward if B–C>S,
whereas Michelman would allow those projects to go forward for which B–C<S provided that B–C>D
(which of course can only be true if D<S). In this sense, Michelman is more permissive than Pareto. In
contrast, Kaldor-Hicks would allow any project for which B–C>0, which makes Michelman less
permissive than Kaldor-Hicks given that min(S,D)>0.
45
Fischel and Shapiro (1988, p. 283-5) note that moral hazard is often wrongly counted as a demoralization
cost.
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This argument is so appealing that it has found its way into the law. For example,
in HFH Ltd. v. Superior Court,46 the court said that “The long settled state of zoning law
renders the possibility of change in zoning clearly foreseeable to … purchasers of
property, who discount their estimate of its value by the probability of such a change.”
The logic of this argument is irrefutable, to a point. To illustrate, suppose that the
unrestricted value of the land is VU, the restricted value is VR, where VU>VR, p is the
probability that the restriction will be enacted, and C is the expected compensation. The
amount that a rational buyer would be willing to pay for the land in the face of the
regulatory threat is thus
p(VR + C) + (1–p)VU.

(33)

The price therefore fully capitalizes the expected amount of compensation. For example,
if compensation were zero, the price would be discounted by the expected loss, p(VU−VR).
Consequently, the buyer would suffer no loss if the regulation occurs (other than the loss
suffered by anyone who loses a fair bet). Michelman would therefore conclude that
demoralization costs are zero in this case.
The problem with this argument is that it ignores the interests of the seller.47
Notice, in particular, that in the absence of a regulatory threat, the seller would expect to
receive a price of VU for his land, but once the regulatory threat is announced, the price
immediately falls to the amount in (33). The resulting “loss” to the seller is the
difference

46

542 P.2d 237 (1975). The notion that landowner expectations matter for compensation is also
exemplified by the ruling in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York (438 U.S. 104, 1978),
which held, in part, that compensation is due if a regulation interferes with “distict investment-backed
expectations” of the owner.
47
See Epstein (1985, pp. 151-158), Fischel and Shapiro (1988, pp. 287-289), and Fischel (1995a, pp. 194197).
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p(VU – VR – C),

(34)

which is only zero if compensation is full (i.e., if C=VU – VR). Capitalization therefore
does not eliminate the need for compensation. It merely shifts the loss (and the
accompanying demoralization costs) to the party whose ownership pre-dated the
announced regulation. Note, however, that this conclusion is not necessarily an argument
for paying compensation to all property owners at the moment that a regulatory threat
first arises, as this policy would be very costly to implement. Rather, it is sufficient to
pay compensation only to those owners whose land is actually regulated, given that the
sale price capitalizes the expected compensation.

6. Conclusion

The eminent domain clause of the Fifth Amendment is ultimately about the limits of
government intervention in the land market. The case law and scholarly literature on this
subject are vast, touching on many issues. Economic theory, by focusing primarily on
efficiency, can shed much light on the various dimensions of the debate. Our survey of
the economics literature has yielded the following conclusions:
1. The correct economic justification for the forced sale of property under eminent
domain is the holdout problem associated with land assembly. This conclusion implies,
first, that eminent domain should not be used for public projects that don’t involve
assembly, and second, that it should be available for private projects, like urban renewal,
that do. The high transaction costs of using eminent domain probably limit its overuse in
the former case, while courts have historically permitted its use by private developers in
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the latter case. When courts do allow the private use of eminent domain, however, they
generally justify it by citing the substantial spillover benefits from the project, rather than
the holdout problem, as the rationale. This has led to considerable confusion in this area
of law.
2. Just compensation has been defined by courts to be the fair market value of the
taken property. There is good reason to believe, however, that this measure
undercompensates landowners relative to what they would have accepted in a consensual
sale. While this may create the risk of excessive takings by the government, the use of a
“value to the owner” measure would create the opposite problem of too few takings
owing to the holdout problem. Market value compensation therefore represents a
practical compromise measure.
3. Physical takings and regulations are treated quite differently by the law in terms
of when compensation is due. In particular, it is always due in the former case but rarely
in the latter. Economic theory, however, does not justify this distinction, as regulations
are merely “partial takings.” One way to understand the different treatment is the notion
that regulations like zoning apply broadly to most properties in a jurisdiction, thereby
providing reciprocal (in-kind) compensation to landowners. In contrast, physical takings
generally single-out a few landowners to bear substantial costs, so monetary
compensation, financed by taxes on all other owners, is needed to satisfy the just
compensation requirement. In this way, a forced sale on one side of the public ledger
(eminent domain) is offset by a forced purchase on the other (taxation).
4. Economic models have shown that payment of full, market-value compensation
leads to a moral hazard problem that causes landowners to overinvest in their property.
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This can be eliminated by lump sum compensation, which includes zero compensation as
a special case. However, the inconsistency of this “no-compensation result” with the
constitutional requirement of just compensation, as well as its perceived unfairness, has
produced several counterarguments. These include: the need to prevent excessive
government takings, the need to forestall premature or preemptive development, the
insurance benefits of compensation for risk-averse landowners, and the demoralization
costs of not paying compensation.
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Appendix

This appendix proves that when landowners are risk averse and can also invest in their
land, the optimal (second best) compensation rule involves partial compensation. To
illustrate, let the compensation rule take the form C= V(x), where 0≤ ≤1. In making
α

α

their investment choices, landowners maximize (31), taking , and the tax payment T, as
α

given. The resulting first-order condition is given by
(1–p)U'(wN)(V'(x)–1) + pU'(wT)( V'–1) = 0,

(A1)

α

where wN and wT are defined by (15) and (16). Let xˆ (α ) denote the solution to (A1).
Note that when =1 (full compensation), (A1) implies V'(x)–1=0, which is the moral
α

hazard outcome, but when =0, V'(x)–1>0, resulting in a lower level of investment.
α

Now consider the value of

α

that landowners would choose at a hypothetical

constitutional convention, knowing their future investment behavior. This involves
choosing the value of

α

that maximizes (31), subject to xˆ (α ) and the balanced budget in

(18). After canceling terms using (A1) and rearranging, we obtain the following
derivative
∂EU
 ∂x̂ 
= –p V'(x)[(1–p)U'(wN)+pU'(wT)] 

∂α
 ∂α 
α

+ (1–p)pV(x)[U'(wT)–U'(wN)].

(A2)

To prove that *>0, set =0 in (A2). The result is
α

α

∂EU
= (1–p)pV(x)[U'(wT)–U'(wN)] > 0,
∂α

(A3)

where the sign follows from the facts that U <0 and wN>wT when =0. Thus, * cannot
α

″

be zero.
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α

Now set =1. Since wN=wT=w in this case, the second term in (A2) drops out,
α

while the first term collapses to
∂EU
 ∂x̂ 
= –pV'(x)U'(w) 
.
∂α
 ∂α 

(A4)

It is possible to show that when =1, ∂xˆ / ∂α > 0 , which implies that (A4) is negative.
α

This proves that *<1. Combining this with the previous result establishes that 0< *<1,
α

α

as claimed.
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Figure 1.
Divergence between market value and reservation price for owners of unsold properties.
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δ
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δ

V/2– , V/2–

Table 1.
Payoff matrix for the sellers’ entry game.
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